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As science continues to progress, attitudes towards science seem to become ever more 
polarized. Whereas some put their faith in science, others routinely reject and dismiss 
scientific evidence. The current chapter provides an integration of recent research on how 
people evaluate science. We organize our chapter along three research topics that are most 
relevant to this goal: ideology, motivation, and morality. We review the relations of political 
and religious ideologies to science attitudes, discuss the psychological functions and 
motivational underpinnings of belief in science, and describe work looking at the role of 
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morality when evaluating science and scientists. In the final part of the chapter, we apply 
what we know about science evaluations to the current crisis of faith in science and the 
open science movement. Here, we also take into account the increased accessibility and 
popularization of science and the (perceived) relations between science and industry. (147 
words) 
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As scientific knowledge continues to accumulate, attitudes towards science appear to 
have become increasingly negative. Although modern history is replete with examples of 
controversy sparked by science, it has been suggested that public distrust in science is once 
again on the increase (e.g., recurring contentious topics in the public debate are climate 
change, vaccination, and genetically modified organisms [GMO]), and that an anti-science 
movement is growing (e.g., Gauchat, 2013; Nature editorial, 2017a; Pittinsky, 2015). Many 
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organizations dedicated to the advancement of science have expressed concerns about the 
risks of a further decline of trust in science as an institution (e.g., KNAW, 2013; Nature 
editorial, 2017b). At the same time, surveys show that science is a highly respected 
profession (e.g., Harris Poll, 2014) and that ? in the Netherlands ? science as an institution is 
trusted more than various other institutions, including media, government, and the court of 
law (KNAW, 2013). Why do some people put their faith in science, whereas others flat out 
reject scientific evidence and distrust science and scientists? The current paper reviews and 
integrates our recent research into the antecedents and consequences of how science is 
evaluated (both positively and negatively), with the aim to foster an understanding of the 
polarized attitudes towards science that characterize our time. In addition, we relate these 
insights into the antecedents of attitudes towards science to recent changes in the ways in 
which science is conducted and disseminated.   
1.1. Cognitive constraints to science understanding 
Research in social and cognitive psychology has explored attitudes towards science  
from a number of different perspectives. Initially, research focused mainly on the cognitive 
constraints to understanding science, a perspective that exerts a certain educational (and 
sometimes perhaps even patronizing) attitude towards the public. We start with providing a 
brief overview of the most important insights that this research has generated. 
Several theoretical and empirical accounts describe how science is hard to understand 
and learn, that is, that it does not come naturally to humans. Unlike religious belief, science 
understanding requires cognitive skills that are not easily acquired (McCauley, 2011; 
Shtulman, 2017). In other words, many features of science are cognitively unnatural: 
scientific theories can be  “ƌĂĚŝĐĂůůǇ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞ ?  ?DĐCauley, 2011, p. 107-117), and 
learning about them and genuinely understanding the scientific processes involved requires 
substantial scientific training. Blancke, De Smedt, De Cruz, Boudry, and Braeckman (2012) 
reviewed some of the most prominent cognitive biases hampering the understanding and 
acceptance of evolutionary theory, which are essentialism, teleology, and intuitions about 
agency and intentionality (which is also referred to as the intentional stance; Dennett, 
1989). These biases have been applied to science understanding more generally as well, and 
we briefly describe each below.  
5 
 
People intuitively perceive the natural world as emerging from invisible and 
immutable essences, which carve the world into homogenous and discrete categories 
(Gelman, 2003). This tendency, termed psychological essentialism, has been documented in 
diverse samples around the world (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Essentialist 
thinking tends to be simple, unfalsifiable, and relies on imagined and invisible forces for 
understanding the natural world. Importantly, it can lead people to misunderstand scientific 
accounts of the world (see Heine, 2017, for a review). As one example, people who engage 
in more essentialist thinking are more likely to misunderstand evolutionary theory, because 
they tend to see species as more homogeneous and discrete categories (Evans, 2001; 
Shtulman & Schulz, 2008). The drawbacks of psychological essentialism have been 
particularly evident in the ways that people make sense of genetic concepts (Dar-Nimrod & 
Heine, 2011). Because ŐĞŶĞƐ ƐŚĂƌĞ ƐŽ ŵĂŶǇ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŽǀĞƌůĂƉ ǁŝƚŚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
understandings of essences (they are invisible, they can be transmitted across generations, 
they divide the social and natural world into discrete and homogeneous categories, they are 
natural, they exist unchanged from conception to death, they are unique to individuals, and 
they help make an individual who he or she is), people frequently understand genetic 
concepts in ways consistent with psychological essentialism (see Heine, Dar-Nimrod, 
Cheung, & Proulx, 2017). Indeed, whereas many surveys reveal that the lay public has a 
rather limited understanding of genetic concepts (Christensen, Jayaratne, Roberts Kardia, & 
Petty, 2010; Lanie et al., 2004), people nonetheless make attributions to genetics on a 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƌďĂƐŝƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƚŽƵƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌE ? ?ƚŽŽŶĂůĚdƌƵŵƉ
ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐ ŚŝƐ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ Śŝŵ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ  “Ă ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ŐĞŶĞ ?  ?,ĞŝŶĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?Moreover, much 
research finds that when people learn that genes are involved in a human trait, they come 
to think of that trait in terms that are more like an essence, regardless of whether that trait 
involves sexual orientation, ethnicity, mental health, violence, sex, or obesity (see Heine et 
al., 2017, for a review). This tendency to misunderstand concepts that are linked to genes is 
especially problematic because, as the first law of behavioral genetics reminds us, genes are 
involved in virtually all human traits (Turkheimer, 2000), but their impact is far more 
complex and involves a far more complex interplay of genes than people assume. Thus, the 
human tendency to seek essences to explain the natural world contributes to a general 
misunderstanding of science.  
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Teleology, or the assumption that there is purpose to the ways in which animals, 
plants, and natural phenomena are structured and function, is another cognitive obstacle to 
science understanding. Although so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ?ƉƌŽŵŝƐĐƵŽƵƐ ƚĞůĞŽůŽŐǇ ?  ?<ĞůĞŵĞŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ŝƐ
particularly strong in children, it is also found among uneducated adults, as well as 
ůǌŚĞŝŵĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ  ?Ğ ?Ő ? ?  “/ƚ ƌĂŝŶƐ ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ƉůĂŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŶŝŵĂůƐŚĂǀĞ ǁĂƚĞƌ ƚŽ ĚƌŝŶŬ ĂŶĚ
ŐƌŽǁ ? ?>ŽŵďƌŽǌŽĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?. Indeed, even schooled adults and professional scientists are 
prone to an intuitive teleological bias, that is, when under time pressure they show an 
automatic tendency to reason about the natural world in teleological ways (Kelemen, 
Rottman, & Seston, 2013).  
Finally, the human mind is hardwired to detect intention and infer agency, in particular 
when there is a need to interpret changes in the environment (Guthrie, 1993; Newman, Keil, 
Kuhlmeier, & Wynn, 2010; van Elk, Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2016). This 
cognitive mechanism is a feature of our minds that has been argued to be biologically 
evolved (Haselton & Nettle, 2006) and to confer an adaptive advantage. Just like inferring 
purpose (i.e., teleology), inferring intention reflects a cognitive bias that can impair science 
understanding (consider evolutionary theory, the second law of thermodynamics, or general 
relativity: these perspectives all leave little room for purpose or intention, which contributes 
to their counterintuitiveness).  
In sum, science often contradicts (flawed) human intuitions about what reality consists 
of and how things work, which spring from a set of evolved cognitive biases1. Many scientific 
theories ? including evolutionary theory, spherical earth theory, general relativity, and 
quantum mechanics ? are highly counterintuitive, and this counterintuitive nature impairs 
science understanding.     
1.2. Beyond cognitive constraints: ideology, motivation, and morality 
It is not just that people reject science because they lack the ability to understand it; 
oftentimes people reject science because it runs afoul of the way they prefer to think. Most 
of the research reviewed in this chapter will focus on the latter. Recently, researchers, in 
                                                           
1 It is interesting to note that the same cognitive biases that hamper science understanding have 
been argued to facilitate religious belief, particularly according to so-called cognitive byproduct 
theories of religion (Atran & Norenzayan; Barret, 2000); we will return to religion in Section 2. 
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particular social psychologists, have started to pay increased attention to the motivational 
and ideological antecedents of science understanding. These analyses closely resemble the 
ways in which social psychologists, alongside political scientists and psychology of religion 
scholars, have been investigating the intrapsychic motivational underpinnings of political 
ideology and religious belief. Indeed, social psychology as a field has a longstanding interest 
in political ideology (e.g., see the journal Political Psychology; also see Kay & Brandt, 2016) 
and religious belief (e.g., International Journal for the Psychology of Religion; a Personality 
and Social Psychology Review special issue on religion, Sedikides, 2010; also see Laurin and 
Kay, 2017). However, work on the ideological and motivational underpinnings of science 
acceptance and rejection is a relatively recent endeavor. This is striking, because our time is 
not only characterized by religious and political disagreements and conflicts, but also by a 
 ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?'ĂƵĐŚĂƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚhigh levels of public ambivalence toward the 
scientific enterprise (e.g., Nagy, Wylie, Eschrich, & Finn, 2017; Pittinsky, 2015). This 
ambivalence has been argued to stem, among other things, from ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ moral objections 
against particular scientific findings (e.g., intuitive opposition to GMOs; denial of 
anthropogenic climate change; vaccine skepticism; Bain et al., 2012; Blancke et al., 2015; 
Lewandosky & Oberauer, 2016; Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, under review; Scott et al., 
2016), but also from the perceived motivations and agendas of science and scientists (e.g., 
Gleick et al., 2010; Rutjens & Heine, 2016).  
The current chapter focuses on recent research that aims to uncover which 
ideological, motivational, and moral processes shape attitudes toward science and what it 
entails to believe in science. When do people embrace science and when do they reject 
scientific evidence, and how do they evaluate science as an enterprise and scientists as the 
agents that represent this enterprise? We aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
recent work on motivated evaluations of science, by reviewing and integrating three recent 
lines of research: 1) the relations of religious belief and political ideology to attitudes 
towards science, 2) the existential-motivational underpinnings and functions of belief in 
science; 3) the effects of morality on evaluations of science and scientists. As we will see, 
conservative ideology (in particular, conservative religious and political beliefs) generally is 
negatively related to science acceptance, and the same negative relation applies to moral 
concerns and science. Intrapsychic motivations, however, can both pull people towards and 
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push people away from science, and this depends on particular features of scientific 
theories and evidence, as well as on the extent to which people endorse science and 
scientific progress as a worldview. In the last part of the chapter, we highlight the societal 
relevance of science attitudes and discuss some of the ways in which public confidence in 
science might have recently been eroded, but also how recent developments might restore 
trust in science. 
 
2. IDEOLOGY: RELATIONS OF RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL BELIEFS TO SCIENCE 
ATTITUDES 
Two predictors of attitudes towards science, which may help to determine to what 
extent certain people will accept or dismiss scientific evidence, are religious belief and 
political ideology. Initially, scholars particularly focused on political conservatism as a 
predictor of science skepticism. In addition to conservatism, these scholars have also looked 
at other individual difference variables, in particular conspirational thinking style, or 
conspiracist ideation (Douglas & Sutton, 2015; Lewandowsky et al., 2013a; 2013b). In recent 
work, we found that the predictive value of political conservatism depends on the topic that 
is being evaluated: Not all science skepticism is equal, whereas religion more consistently 
predicted science rejection and skepticism (Rutjens et al., under review). These results 
resonate with a long-standing research tradition that documents the tense relation between 
science and religion. We will first turn to research on political ideology and the science-
religion relation, after which we will continue with an overview of science skepticism 
resulting from perceptions of agendas and conspiracies that bias scientific methods and 
conclusions.   
 2.1 Religion and politics: The heterogeneity of science skepticism  
Many of the topics that have the professional interest of scientists are of relevance to 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? dŚƌĞĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ
have particularly focused on ? and that have already been mentioned earlier in this 
chapter ? are climate science, childhood vaccination, and genetic modification of organisms 
(GMO). These are contentious topics ? at least outside the scientific community ? that many 
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people have strong opinions about. Other contentious topics, some of which fall in other 
categories than the aforementioned environmental and biomedical sciences, are evolution, 
nanotechnology, equality, and drugs and health (Blancke et al., 2012; Brossard, Scheufele, 
Kim, & Lewenstein, 2008; van der Lee & Ellemers, 2017; Sutton, Lee, & Hartley, under 
review).  
Several authors have pointed to an increase in distrust in science that is particularly 
visible among conservatives (e.g., Gauchat, 2012; Pittinsky, 2015). Evidence for political 
conservatism as an antecedent of science skepticism, particularly pertaining to climate 
change denial, comes from a program of research conducted by Lewandowsky and 
colleagues (Lewandowsky et al., 2013a; 2013b; Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016). Political 
conservatism, alongside endorsement of free-market economics, has been found to reliably 
predict skepticism about anthropogenic climate change. One obvious reason for this is that 
potential policy implications of acknowledging climate change as problematic generally does 
not fit well with social and economic conservatism (also see Campbell & Kay, 2014). A recent 
meta-analysis confirms the association between political conservatism and climate change 
skepticism (Hornsey, Harris, Bain, & Fielding, 2016). However, no such robust association 
was obtained for anti-vaccine attitudes. On the contrary, vaccine skepticism has been 
reported to be slightly more pronounced among progressives (Lewandowsky et al., 2013). In 
a similar vein, researchers have failed to find an association between political ideology and 
GMO attitudes (see also Kahan, 2015; Scott, Inbar, & Rozin, 2016). Thus, when the aim is to 
ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ?ũƵƐƚŚĂǀŝŶŐĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůďĞůŝĞĨƐ
is not sufficient.  
To test more systematically the ideological underpinnings of science acceptance and 
rejection, we recently conducted a series of online studies with US participants in which we 
measured political ideology and religious belief as potential antecedents of skepticism about 
climate change, vaccines, and GMOs (Rutjens et al., under review). Moreover, in doing so, 
we controlled for moral concerns, scientific literacy (see Hayes & Tarick, 2000; Kahan et al., 
2012), and demographic variables, and we included measures of general faith in science 
(Farias et al., 2013) and a behavioral measure of willingness to support science. This 
measure consisted of a pie chart presented to participants that included various spending 
areas, one of which was science. Participants were instructed to rearrange the areas in 
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order of spending budget, reflecting their preferred order of prioritization. We then simply 
assessed how much priority participants gave to science.  
One of the triggers of this work was that we observed that religious belief is given 
surprisingly limited attention in the bulk of the aforementioned work on science skepticism. 
This is striking, given the tense relation between science and religion that is the focal point 
of much theoretical and empirical work, a point that we will return to in the next paragraph. 
Another reason for us to simultaneously include various measures of political ideology and 
religious beliefs, alongside moral concerns and knowledge about science (scientific literacy), 
was that these variables intercorrelate and are therefore potentially confounded. Political 
conservatives, for example, are on average more religious than liberals (Layman, 2001; 
Malka et al., 2012), and conservatives and religious believers alike emphasize traditional 
moral values, for example those values that pertain to purity and naturalness (e.g., Graham 
et al., 2009; see also Piazza & Sousa, 2014).  
Our findings, obtained in three studies, were largely consistent and highlighted the 
importance of religiosity as a predictor of science acceptance and rejection. Using 
hierarchical regression analyses, we found that climate change skepticism was best 
predicted by political conservatism. This corroborates earlier work (Lewandoswky et al., 
2013b; Hornsey et al., 2016). In contrast, vaccine skepticism was best predicted by religiosity  
and moral purity concerns. Political conservatism did not play a meaningful role. We also 
observed that, among the religious participants, the more orthodox ones were skeptical 
about vaccines because of a low general faith in science. Furthermore, neither political nor 
religious ideology predicted GMO skepticism. Rather, faith in science and scientific literacy 
were the strongest negative predictors of GMO skepticism. General belief in science and the 
willingness to support science (through the allocation of monetary resources to science) 
were best predicted by religious orthodoxy.   
Thus, the above research speaks to the heterogeneous nature of belief in science and 
science skepticism: We concluded from these findings that political ideology and religiosity 
independently predict science acceptance and rejection, depending on the topic of 
investigation. KĨ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ďĞƐŝĚĞƐ ƚŚĞ  ?ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ ? ƚŽƉŝĐƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĂďŽǀĞ
research addresses, there are many other topics of investigation in science that are less 
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ideologically fueled or perhaps even well aligned with political and religious convictions 
(e.g., imagine research yielding evidence that married people live longer and healthier lives, 
research on biological sex differences, or archeological evidence for the existence of Jesus 
Christ). However, returning to our research, we concluded that ? when competing for 
explained variance with other potential predictors ? political conservatism only reliably 
predicted climate change skepticism. Religious identity and religious orthodoxy were 
identified as the main predictors of skepticism about vaccination and of general belief in, 
and willingness to support, science. Over and above religious identity, concerns about moral 
purity and naturalness also helped predict vaccine skepticism. Next, we discuss these results 
in light of the complex relationship between science and religion.   
2.2 Science and/or religion 
It is not an exaggeration to state that the relationship between science and religion has 
been tense and contentious throughout history (leading to outbursts of conflict when new 
scientific theories clashed with conventional religious doctrine, as was the case with Galilei 
'ĂůŝůĞŽ ?Ɛ ŚĞůŝŽĐĞŶƚƌŝĐ ŵŽĚĞů Žƌ ĂƌǁŝŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ŽƚŚ
science and religion ask the most basic of questions that surround existence: How do we 
explain our world, how did life evolve, and why are we here? And both formulate (often 
very different) answers to these questions, by providing ultimate explanations for life and 
the universe that can be at odds with each other, thereby invalidating eacŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ
(e.g., in the case of evolution by natural selection). Another way of putting this is that 
science and religion both function as ultimate (and therefore incompatible) explanatory 
frameworks or belief systems (Blancke et al., 2012; Farias, 2013; McCauley, 2011; Preston & 
Epley, 2009; Thagard & Findlay, 2010), which stands in contrast to the position that science 
and religion cover different domains of knowledge (i.e., they should be understood as non-
overlapping magisteria; Gould, 1997). Proponents of the latter position might also argue 
that science is based on having faith in observation, while religion is based on having faith in 
that which transcends observation.   
 The incompatibility of science and religion has also been tested in the psychology lab. 
For instance, Preston and Epley (2009) showed that scientific and religious explanations are 
automatically opposed, so that exposure to a poor (strong) explanation in one domain 
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enhanced (reduced) positive evaluations of explanations in the other domain. However, 
other research has shown that people in some cases also synthesize religious and scientific 
explanations, and that these explanations can co-exist. For example, children as well as 
adults have been found to combine magical thinking and science to explain AIDS (Legare, 
Evans, Rosengren, & Harris, 2012) and to endorse natural and supernatural explanations 
simultaneously for the same unusual event (Wooley, Cornelius, & Lacy, 2011). One often-
quoted reason for the tense relation between scientific and religious explanation goes back 
to the cognitive biases described in the first part of this chapter, which tend to facilitate 
religious explanations (which align neatly with these biases; Atran and Norenzayan, 2004) 
while at the same time constraining scientific explanations (which are often 
counterintuitive; McCauley, 2011). Another, more motivational reason for the tension 
between science and religion ? that we have discussed in our own research as well ? is that 
scientific and technological breakthroughs sometimes run counter to deeply held religious 
values, for example, in the case of stem cell research and genome editing (Heine et al., 
2016; Rutjens et al., 2016). Another example from a different science domain is 
paleontological evidence for the age of the earth. With all this in mind, it is not surprising 
that our research on the heterogeneity of science skepticism found religious orthodoxy to 
be the most reliable negative predictor of general faith in science and the willingness to 
support science.  
 A third catalyst of the tension between science and religion ? which likely also plays a 
role alongside motivation in the example of stem cell research and genome editing above ?
is morality. The argumentation goes as follows: First, religion and morality are closely 
ŝŶƚĞƌƚǁŝŶĞĚŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚƐ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐŝƚŚĂƚďĞůŝĞĨŝn God is seen by many 
as a necessary component for moral living (Gervais, 2014; McKay & Whitehouse, 2015; 
Norenzayan, 2014; Pew, 2014). Second, scientific explanation is often at odds with religious 
faith, as described above. These observations combined make it clear that science and 
morality might not sit well together and might in many cases be hard to reconcile. In 
addition, science may also be viewed as morally suspicious because advances in science and 
technology are frequently associated with societal pessimism, erosion of moral values, and 
technological disaster (Gray, 2004; Rutjens et al., 2016). Besides the earlier examples of 
stem cell research and genome editing, other examples that are not directly problematic in 
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religious terms are atomic energy, artificial intelligence, and superbugs. Here, moral 
concerns pertaining to harm and purity might play a more prominent role than religiosity. 
We will delve deeper into morality in Section 4, in which we review research that 
investigated the impact of moral concerns on science attitudes.  
2.3 Agendas and conspiracies 
In the previous sections, we have reviewed research on the political and religious 
antecedents of science acceptance and rejection. But science is itself a social enterprise ?
conducted by individuals with their own ideological values and ideas ? and awareness of this 
notion can lead people to question the motives of the scientists. In this section, we review 
research looking at perceptions of biased agendas of scientists, and then at conspiracy 
beliefs pertaining to science. (In section 4, we will delve more directly into stereotypes 
about scientists.) 
Science is often idealized as the pursuit of knowledge in its purist form. The sociologist 
Merton (1942) articulated this understanding of science as a set of norms. According to one 
of these norms, disinterestedness, scientists (and their institutions) should not act to further 
their own personal gain, but instead only in the interest of furthering knowledge. The 
communalism norm requires that scientists should share their methods and results openly, 
so that they are the property of the community rather than any particular researcher or 
institution. The organized skepticism norm requires that scientists should set aside their 
values and convictions in order to subject all claims of fact to detached critical scrutiny. The 
universalism norm requires that access to scientific pursuits should be free to all. This means 
that evalƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐĂƌĞĞƌ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ŵĂĚĞ
available to them should depend only on their competence, and not any other characteristic 
(e.g., their nationality, ethnicity, political beliefs, or gender).   
Any seasoned scientist reading this will immediately recognize that these norms are 
ideals that science falls short of, both regularly and systematically. Nonetheless, to varying 
degrees, scientists seem to internalize these norms (Anderson, Martinson, & De Vries, 2007) 
and present science to the world as if it were a purely value-free, dispassionate, Mertonian 
enterprise (Gieryn, 1999). Mandel and Tetlock (2016) argue that this characterization of 
ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ĂŶ ŝĚĞĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ďƵƚ Ă  “ŵǇƚŚ ? ? ƐŝŶĐĞ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ƐĞƌǀĞƐ Ă ƌĂŶge of social 
functions besides the production of knowledge. Nonetheless, it has a powerful effect on 
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how scientists and the public evaluate science. On the upside, it motivates genuine reform 
movements designed to improve research practices. On the downside, it fuels derogation of 
science on the grounds that in specific ways it falls short, or is alleged to fall short, of its 
ideal standards.         
2.3.1. Biased agendas. One shortcoming of science is that women and ethnic 
majorities appear to be systematically disadvantaged in scientific education, career 
progression, and research funding  W ŝŶǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDĞƌƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƚǇŶŽƌŵ ?DŽƐƐ-
Racusin et al., 2012; van der Lee & Ellemers, 2015). This has triggered systematic efforts to 
redress the balance, such as the Athena SWAN Charter in the UK (Donald, Harvey, & 
MCLean, 2011), in which universities are accountable for their efforts to promote gender 
equality, and more recently, other forms of diversity. However, to date, interventions to 
promote diversity are seldom conducted and evaluated systematically, and may provoke 
resentment and backlash effects (Moss-Racusin, van der Toorn, Dovidio, Brecoll, Graham, & 
Handelsman, 2014; van der Lee & Ellemers, in preparation). Though the predominance of 
particular gender and ethnic groups in science can be seen to affect its priorities and color 
its conclusions, it does not appear to have caused widespread questioning of the truth value 
of scientific research in the media or the public imagination.   
 This sanguinity may be starkly contrasted with reactions to another demographic bias 
in the scientific community. There is good evidence that the makeup of the social-scientific 
community is heavily biased in favor of liberals; conservatives, for example, are massively 
under-represented relative to the overall population. Further, there is evidence that liberals 
are promoted more quickly than conservatives, suggesting a further violation of the 
Mertonian norm of universalism. Critics both within and outside the scientific community 
have cast doubt on scientific research on the grounds of this bias (e.g., Duarte, Crawford, 
Stern, Haidt, Jussim, & Tetlock, 2015). In Mertonian parlance, this particular prima facie 
violation of universalism is argued to lead to violations of both organized skepticism 
(scientists are insufficiently critical of results that are congenial to liberal ideology) and of 
disinteredness (scientists conduct research to advance liberal causes). Indeed Duarte et al. 
(2015, p. 1) explicitly link this to the so-called reproducibility crisis (see Section 5.1 below) 
ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇǁƌŝƚĞƚŚĂƚ “ŽŶĞůĂƌŐĞůǇŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬĞĚĐĂƵƐĞŽĨĨĂŝůƵƌĞŝƐĂůĂĐŬŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ? ?
ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞ  “ǁŽƵůĚ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů 
ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?The liberal bias has been widely covered in the media (e.g., Huffington Post UK, 
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March 2015), with stories that cast doubt over the validity and integrity of research. This 
suggests that public awareness of a liberal bias in the scientific community can have 
negative effects on public acceptance of science findings.     
2.3.2. Conspiracy theories. It is bad enough for scientists when they are perceived to 
have some kind of agenda that biases their methods and conclusions. Worse, they are 
sometimes seen, whether in the pursuit of this agenda or sheer self-interest, to be colluding 
with each other to distort, conceal, and falsify their results. In other words, they find 
themselves to be at the centre of conspiracy theories: beliefs that individuals, usually 
powerful, are acting together in secret to accomplish some selfish, usually malevolent, goal 
(Sutton & Douglas, 2014). Secrecy, deception, and selfishness are profoundly incompatible 
with idealized notions of communal science (e.g., Merton, 1972). It is therefore no surprise 
that exposing people to conspiracy theories about climate and vaccination science leads to 
disillusionment with scientists and, in turn, reluctance to act in accordance with their 
findings  W for example, by taking measures to mitigate climate change, or by vaccinating 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?:ŽůůĞǇ ?ŽƵŐůĂƐ ? ? ? ? ?a, 2014b, in press; van der Linden, 2015). Our recent 
research also suggests that these conspiracy theories not only cause people to reject science 
but also lead to support for measures to effectively shut it down  W for example by defunding 
and censoring scientific research, surveilling and sanctioning scientists, and preventing them 
from offering policy advice to government (Sutton, Douglas, & Petterson, in preparation). 
Conspiracy theories about science would not present a major obstacle to public 
acceptance of science if they were confined to the fringes of society or endorsed only by 
psychologically troubled individuals, as the popular, derogatory stereotype of the 
 “ĐŽŶƐƉŝƌĂĐǇ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ  ?,ƵƐƚŝŶŐ  ? Kƌƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŽǀĞƌ Ă ƚŚŝƌĚ ŽĨ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐĂŐƌĞĞ ƚŚĂƚ  “ŐůŽďĂůǁĂƌŵŝŶŐ ŝƐĂŚŽĂǆ ? ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽĂ ƌĞĐĞŶƚƉŽůů  ?WƵďůŝĐWŽůŝĐǇ
Polling, 2013). Other conspiracy theories about science, for example on vaccination, are less 
widely endorsed, but feature prominently in anti-science communication. For example, 
Bessi et al. (2015) found that anti-science conspiracy content was shared on Facebook 
roughly three times as often as science content. Crucially, even conspiracy beliefs that seem 
unrelated to the topic of climate change, such as those concerning the assassination of JFK, 
are robustly associated with skepticism about climate change (Lewandowsky et al., 2013).  
 One reason that conspiracy thinking contributes to the rejection of science is probably 
that it is very unlike scientific reasoning (Barkun, 2003; Lewandowsky et al., 2015). It does 
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not appear to respect principles of parsimony, as illustrated by studies that show people 
who accept conspiracy theories are also prone to committing reasoning errors (Brotherton 
& French, 2014). It is also tolerant of internal contradiction: Participants who endorsed the 
belief that Princess Diana faked her own death also tended to endorse the belief that she 
was murdered, apparently because of their commitment to the higher-order belief that the 
official account of her death is a cover-up (Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2013). Swami (2013) 
showed that conspiracy beliefs are correlated with measures of reliance on gut-level 
intuition rather than logic, and are decreased by manipulations that encourage analytical 
thinking. It is also associated with magical and teleological thinking, and in particular the so-
called intentionality bias in which inanimate objects and systems are seen as sentient and 
motivated (also see Section 1.1 on cognitive constraints). In our own work (Douglas, Sutton, 
Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016), we showed that conspiracy thinking is associated with 
magical thinking (belief in causation by physically impossible means) and the perception 
that weather systems (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010) and moving geometrical shapes 
(Heider & Simmel, 1944) have intentions. Finally, although conspiracy theories may not 
always be falsifiable, conspiracy thinkers tend to be resistant to falsification, because they 
believe that disproofs and debunks offered by up authorities are not only unconvincing but 
may themselves be part of the ongoing conspiracy to cover up events and mislead the public 
(Jolley & Douglas, in press; Lewandowsky et al., 2015).  
 Another reason why conspiracy theories may have gained such purchase in the 
rejection of science is that, although it is possible to entertain conspiracy theories about any 
agents, they tend to focus on the alleged wrongdoings of institutions, elites, and authorities, 
including journalists, government officials, politicians, and, of course, scientists. Uscinski and 
WĂƌĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ “ĐŽŶƐƉŝƌĂĐǇƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐĂƌĞĨŽƌůŽƐĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĚĂƚĂƚŽ
suggest that conspiracy theories point the finger at incumbent more often than opposition 
groups and thrive among political groups that find themselves out of power. Sociologists 
have argued that conspiracy theories offer a way for disempowered groups to make sense 
of their situation and gain from that a compensatory sense of control.  In keeping with these 
arguments, social psychologists have shown that people in disadvantaged minority groups 
(Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999) and those experimentally reminded of times 
in which they lacked personal control (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) are more prone to adopt 
conspiracy theories. In the same vein, people whose worldviews are threatened by 
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consensually accepted scientific findings may turn to conspiracy theories that cast doubt on 
those findings and so provide compensatory validation of their beliefs.  
 Research has yet to offer a clear answer to how the attritional effect of conspiracy 
belief on acceptance of science may be countered. Studies indicate that attempting to 
debunk anti-science conspiracy theories yields mixed results. Recent research by Jolley and 
Douglas (in press) suggests that it is better to psychologically inoculate people by providing 
anti-conspiracy information before, rather than after, they are exposed to conspiracy 
theories  W a result in keeping with the idea that conspiracy beliefs are resistant to 
falsification (also see van der Linden et al., 2017). Given that various studies have linked 
conspiracy theories to lower levels of education and analytical thinking, it is possible that 
education, especially educational interventions that focus on the development of analytical 
thinking skills, may ultimately prove effective (Douglas et al., 2016; Swami et al., 2013).   
 It is important to note that not all conspiracy theories are anti-science, just as not all 
are false (Douglas et al., in press). For example, we have drawn attention to the fact that 
conspiracy theories are used as ammunition by both sides of the so-called climate war 
(Sutton & Douglas, 2015). Whereas one side accuses scientists and governments of colluding 
to sow fear in the public imagination, the other accuses the oil industry, maverick scientists, 
and right-wing political stooges of colluding to sow doubt. The latter conspiracy theories 
have a meta-conspiracy character, suggesting that the claim that global warming is a hoax is 
itself being propagated as part of a broader conspiracy to discredit science. These 
conspiracy theories are, unsurprisingly, linked not to doubt but to belief in climate change, 
even after adjusting for the political polarization of belief in different conspiracy theories 
(conservatives favor anti-science conspiracies, whereas liberals favor anti-oil lobby 
conspiracies; Sutton, Douglas, & Petterson, in preparation).   
 
3. MOTIVATION: PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS UNDERLYING BELIEF IN SCIENCE  
Ideologies and worldviews, such as the religious and political beliefs ? and indeed also 
the conspiracy beliefs ? described in section 2, are shaped importantly by the psychological 
functions they fulfill: people want to adhere to certain political ideologies or maintain their 
religious beliefs because these help them to perceive the world in which they live as 
controllable, orderly, and (existentially) meaningful (e.g., Greenberg, Solomon & 
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Pyszczynski, 2009; Kay et al., 2010; Laurin & Kay, 2017; Proulx & Heine, 2006). These 
motivations can be classified as either leaning toward the epistemological (i.e., the need to 
learn about the world and be able to predict future outcomes) or as leaning toward the 
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚŽŶĞ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶŝƚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ and 
significance). However, one should probably view the aforementioned motivations not as 
mutually exclusive dichotomous categories (that are either purely epistemological or purely 
existential) but rather as existing somewhere along a continuum; we would argue that the 
need to maintain perceptions of the world as orderly, under control, and meaningful all 
have both epistemological and existential aspects to them (also see Laurin & Kay, 2017; 
Rutjens et al., 2016).  
As we mentioned in section 1.2, ample social psychological work has focused on the 
intrapsychic motivational underpinnings of religious belief and political ideology, and we 
refer the interested reader to a recent review of this work (Laurin & Kay, 2017). Importantly, 
in our own and others ?ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?results have shown that some of the same psychological 
needs for order, control, and meaning that shape religious and political beliefs also shape 
evaluations ofͶand belief inͶscience. Thus far in the chapter, we have seen that there are 
various ideological reasons why people are negative about science, but science can also 
function as a belief system in its own right that may fulfill important psychological 
motivations. We review this work below.  
 3.1. Psychological functions of science 
Several important human motivations have been studied in the context of religiosity, 
including identity, belonging and attachment needs, self-esteem, control and order, 
uncertainty reduction, and (existential) meaning (Sedikides, 2010). Research on the 
motivational underpinnings of political ideology has mainly focused on how political beliefs 
relate to control and order needs and ? to a lesser extent ? existential meaning motives 
(Greenberg et al., 2009; Kay et al., 2010; Kay & Brandt, 2016).   
 Research on the motivational underpinnings and psychological functions of belief in 
science so far has predominantly focused on the order and control conferring qualities of 
science. Also, some work has focused on the viability of science as a source of existential 
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meaning. In the following section, we start with reviewing the main research results from 
our lab on science as a source of compensatory order and control.  
3.1.1 Can science provide order and control? 
We conducted the first test of the hypothesis that science can be a used as a source of 
compensation when personal control is threatened, in a similar way as religious belief. We 
investigated whether compensation for low control could be conferred from both religious 
and scientific views on the origins of life (Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2010). 
Perceptions of control were manipulated using a recall task, in which participants were 
asked to remember a negative situation over which they had no (full) control and 
subsequently summarize the situation. After the recall task, they were also asked to provide 
three reasons that support the notion that the future is uncontrollable (controllable). Next, 
participants were presented with two of three different accounts on the origins of life: 
ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ? ĂƌǁŝŶ ?Ɛ dŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ Ă more contemporary (albeit 
contested) variation on evolutionary theory, which offers a view on evolution as an orderly 
and predictable process. The gist of the latter perspective was that processes of natural 
selection are bound by various laws, meaning that if evolution were to be replayed the 
results would be more or less the same. In contrast, the Darwinian perspective emphasized 
the randomness and unpredictability of evolutionary processes. The intelligent design 
perspective focused on the existence of a supernatural agent who to some extent controls 
the outcomes of human evolution. We asked participants to choose from pairs of the 
aforementioned theoretical accounts. The results indicated that a control-threat led to a 
preference shift in favor of intelligenƚĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ďƵƚŽŶůǇǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞǁĂƐĂƌǁŝŶ ?Ɛ
Theory of Evolution. When the alternative was an orderly view on evolution, this preference 
shift was not found. In addition, control-threat lead to a preference shift in favor of an 
orderly view on evolution when the alternative was Darwin ?Ɛ dŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ. Thus, 
control-threat not only sparked a motivational push towards a religious view on evolution, 
but it also pushed participants to a scientific explanation, provided that this explanation was 
orderly. Thus, when lacking control, people seek order and prevention of (further) 
randomness, and they search for this both in religious and in scientific explanations about 
the world.  
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 In a different set of studies (Rutjens, van Harreveld, van der Pligt, Kreemers, & 
Noordewier, 2013), we examined whether comparable preference shifts result from threats 
to personal control when participants are asked to choose between different, competing 
scientific theories about the same processes or phenomena, depending on the extent to 
which these theories provided order and predictability. To do so, we used short descriptions 
of stage theories and continuum theories within the domains of grief recovery ?ůǌŚĞŝŵĞƌ ?Ɛ
disease, and moral development. We hypothesized that when participants ? personal control 
was threatened, they would show an increased endorsement of scientific stage theories. 
Why would stage theories become more attractive as a result of control-threat? We built on 
the idea that stage theories help to structure reality, by molding a complex interplay of 
behavioral and environmental variables into a predictable and orderly sequence of discrete 
stages. Continuum theories do not confer that psychological advantage to the same degree, 
because these theories tend to describe processes and phenomena as gradual transitions 
without abrupt changes or discrete steps. The process is more fluid and lacks qualitatively 
different stages. Results of five studies supported our hypotheses, showing that a threat to 
personal control (using the same manipulation as described above; Rutjens et al., 2010) 
increased preference for stage theories of grief reĐŽǀĞƌǇ ?ůǌŚĞŝŵĞƌ ?ƐĚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ?ĂŶĚŵŽƌĂů
development (see Figure 1). We also found that a more direct threat to order perceptions 
(which we established by priming participants with randomness related words; see also Kay, 
Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010) increased stage theory preference, and, in one study, we found 
that a motivated search for order underlay the preference shift. Here, participants were 
presented with an illusory pattern perception task; a set of grainy pictures of which some 
contained images and some did not. Consistent with previous work (Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008), control-threat increased the number of reported patterns for pictures in which none 
existed. Moreover, illusory pattern perception mediated the effects of control-threat on 
stage theory preference: Participants in the control-threat condition were more motivated 
to impose order ? resulting in the reporting of more illusory patterns ? which in turn led to 
an increased preference for scientific stage theories.  
Although threats to order and control can lead to a heightened embrace of science, 
learning about particular scientific findings can also lead people to feel threatened, which, in 
turn, can lead to a motivated rejection of these findings as facts. For example, Feinberg and 
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Willer (2010) found that particularly gloomy messages about global warming pose a threat 
ƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŽƌĚĞƌĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ǁŚŝĐŚůĞĂĚƐƚŽůĞƐƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨthe notion of 
anthropogenic climate change. Also, we know from other lines of work that threat can lead 
to conspiratorial thinking (e.g., Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), a thinking style which contributes 
to science denial (see Section 2.1; Lewandowksy. Oberauer, & Ginac, 2013a; Lewandowsky 
& Oberauer, 2016). Thus, when the aim is to understand the polarization of science 
attitudes, it is important to take into account the notion that both the acceptance of science 
(e.g., belief in a certain theory; a general faith in science) and the rejection of science (e.g., 
perceiving science as a conspiracy or cerƚĂŝŶ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ĂƐ Ă  ?ŚŽĂǆ ? ? ĐĂŶ ĨƵůĨŝůů ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
needs related to order and control.  
 Taken together, the studies described in this section show that the motivation to 
perceive order and experience control shapes science evaluations and endorsement of 
scientific theories. It is important to note that it is not the case that all scientific perspectives 
and theories equally provide order or feelings of control. Many key scientific theories, such 
as evolutionary theory, general relativity, or quantum mechanics, are highly complex and 
counterintuitive and likely do not provide most people with a sense of order and structure. 
If anything, the opposite might be more likely. However, science and technology can also 
ƐŝŵƉůŝĨǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ůŝǀĞƐĂŶĚŝŵƉŽƐe structure on a complex world; GPS helps us to navigate 
the world, cellphones help us to communicate over distance, and meteorology helps us ? at 
least to some degree ? to ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚ ƚŽŵŽƌƌŽǁ ?ƐǁĞĂƚŚĞƌ(Mesoudi et al., 2013; Rutjens, van 
Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2013). In sum, for science to serve this important motivational 




Figure 1. Percentage of participants preferring stage theories of grief recovery, dementia, 






3.1.2 Can science provide existential meaning? 
Tracy, Hart, and Martens (2011) were the first to examine if science is able to provide a 
sense of existential meaning. Similar to Rutjens et al. (2010), these authors looked at 
religious and scientific views on the origin of life. They ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĚ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ Žƌ ĂƌǁŝŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ďǇ a 
reminder of mortality (which is the most commonly used method to induce a threat to 
existential meaning2). The results of four studies indicated that acceptance of intelligent 
design increased, and acceptance of ĂƌǁŝŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇof evolution decreased, in the 
aftermath of an existential meaning threat. Moreover, although controlling for religiosity did 
not alter these effects, it was also found that natural-science students showed the opposite 
pattern of results. This suggests that evolutionary theory can provide existential meaning for 
these students, likely because evolution is a critical part of their understanding of the world. 
More recently, Farias and colleagues showed that a similar mortality salience induction 
increased faith in the scientific method (Farias, Newheiser, Kahane, & Toledo, 2013). These 
studies provide some empirical support for the claim that science can provide an alternative 
                                                           
2 See terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997;Pyszczynski, Solomon, & 













to religion as a source of existential meaning (e.g., Preston, 2011; Sagan, 2006; also see 
Farias, 2015).  
However, recently we investigated more directly if belief in science is related to 
perceptions of existential meaning (Rutjens & Van Elk, in preparation). Using various 
measures of meaning and various measures of belief in science and religious belief, we 
observed a consistent positive relation between religious belief and meaning, but crucially, 
we observed negative (in two studies) and null (in one study) correlations between belief in 
science and perceptions of meaning in life, even when controlling for religious belief and 
other relevant variables. Thus, in contrast to the mortality salience effects reported above, 
we found no evidence that belief in science is related to perceptions of meaning.  
Another way that science connects to existential meaning is that it has been related to 
efforts to strive for human immortality (e.g., life extension technologies, cryonics; De Grey & 
Rae, 2007); indeed, various scholars have long suggested that science can be considered an 
 ?ŝŵŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? ?ƐĞĞ'ƌĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? for an overview of the intellectual history of this idea). 
In addition, recent empirical work has focused on the notion of indefinite life extension, a 
concept that non-religious participants support more when reminded of their own mortality 
(Lifshin et al., 2017; see also Rutjens, van Harreveld, van der Pligt, van Elk, & Pyszczynski, 
2016). The notion that science can harbor a non-religious promise of literal immortality (see 
also Dechesne et al., 2003) particularly pertains to hopes for scientific and technological 
progress, a topic to which we turn next.  
3.2. Psychological functions of belief in progress 
A key aspect of belief and faith in science is the belief in scientific progress. Building on 
the politico-philosophical observations of Gray (2004, 2007; see also Burdett, 2015) that 
belief in progress as a worldview shares many similarities with religious belief (particularly 
the concepts of providence and utopia), we experimentally tested the motivational 
underpinnings and compensatory functions of belief in progress.   
First, in two different lines of research, we investigated whether belief in scientific and 
technological progress can provide order and control. The conceptual idea behind this 
research was that belief in progress entails an acceptance of the view that human history is 
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linearly progressive and therefore to some extent predictable and orderly (Bury, 1920/1955; 
Gray 2004).  ĨŝƌƐƚ ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
perceptions of personal control and subsequently measuring beliefs in social, moral, 
scientific, and technological progress in various ways (Rutjens, van Harreveld, & van der 
Pligt, 2010). Experimentally lowered personal control ? as well as a real life instance of 
lowered control, in this particular case being a passenger in an airborne plane ? led to 
stronger beliefs in social-moral and scientific-technological progress, more defensive 
responses to an essay questioning the reality of progress, and an increased willingness to 
invest in strongly future-oriented areas of scientific research, such as nanotechnology and 
stem cell research. A second set of studies reversed the casual order of the variables and 
manipulated the strength of scientific progress, using a fake newspaper article, after which 
perceptions of order were measured. Participants who read an article that bolstered the 
idea of scientific progress reported perceiving the world as more orderly and structured 
than those who read an article that emphasized the limited rate of meaningful progress 
(Meijers & Rutjens, 2014). Similar findings were later obtained by Hornsey and Fielding 
(2016) and Stavrova, Ehlebracht, and Fetchenhauer (2016). The latter authors, in particular, 
build on and extend our initial findings by showing that belief in scientific progress is 
associated with an enhanced sense of personal control, and additionally showing that this 
enhanced sense of control in turn enhanced wellbeing. Moreover, Stavrova and colleagues 
showed that the intrapsychic motivational functions of belief in scientific progress were 
especially pronounced in cultures in which belief in science is widely shared.  
 “dŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐĂƌĞmyths answering to ƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶŶĞĞĚĨŽƌŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?dŚŝƐƋƵŽƚĞ
by John Gray (2007, p.3) was the starting point of a related line of research in which we 
addressed the question of whether belief in progress can provide existential meaning. In an 
initial paper, we reported three studies in which we employed a terror management theory 
perspective and showed that reminders of mortality led participants to more strongly 
defend the notion of progress; moreover, we found that questioning the notion of progress 
increased the accessibility of death-related cognitions3 (Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van 
Harreveld, 2009). More recently, we followed up on these findings by teasing apart belief in 
                                                           
3 For an elaborate perspective on the concept of death-thought accessibility, we refer to Arndt, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997.  
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social-moral progress and belief in scientific-technological progress (Rutjens et al., 2016). 
Because it could be argued that belief in social-moral progress is quite subjective and open 
to interpretation, whereas belief in scientific-technological progress is more objectively 
observable, it could be that they serve different psychological functions. Scientific and 
technological progress, evidence of which is all around us, could make the future seem more 
controllable (e.g., the promise of solutions to current problems), but seems unlikely to 
provide a sense of existential meaning. Social-moral progress, where humanity and human 
relations advance in some way or another, requires a certain level of faith (Gray, 2007) and 
has been argued to have replaced religious belief in secular societies (Brunner, 1954/1972; 
Norenzayan, 2013). Based on the idea that belief in social-moral progress functions as a 
secular meaning-provider4, we hypothesized that 1) a mortality reminder would increase 
this belief, as compared to a control condition, and 2) a mortality reminder would increase 
this belief in particular among non-religious individuals. Employing a representative sample 
of the Dutch population, we indeed found that a reminder of mortality led to increased 
belief in social-moral ? but not in scientific-technological ? progress, and, as expected, this 
effect was moderated by strength of religious belief.  
In sum, the above research suggests that whereas scientific and technological progress 
provides psychological compensation for threats to personal control and perceptions of 
order, it must be accompanied by a sense of social-moral progress in order to provide 
existential meaning (and, even then, only to individuals who score low on measures of 
religious faith).  
 
4. MORALITY: THE (PERCEIVED) RIGHT AND WRONG OF SCIENCE AND SCIENTISTS 
In the previous section, we have described how threats to important intrapsychic 
motivations can lead to increased acceptance of, and faith in, some kinds of science, 
provided that these kinds of science help people perceive the world as more orderly or 
meaningful. The findings described in section 3 suggest that science, including a belief in 
scientific-technological progress, can provide compensation for threats to order and control. 
Evidence for the existential functions of science, including belief in scientific-technological 
                                                           
4 For a more elaborate reading of these ideas, we refer to Rutjens et al., 2016.  
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progress, however, is less clear-cut. Although some research has found that existential 
threat (e.g., mortality reminders) increases faith in science (Farias et al., 2013) and support 
of scientific technologies (Lifshin et al., 2017), other research has found no evidence for an 
existential function of belief in science and scientific progress (Rutjens et al., 2016; Rutjens 
& Van Elk, in preparation)5. In Section 2, we detailed how ideology ? in particular religious 
and political conservatism ? and perceived conspiracies and agendas negatively impact on 
acceptance of science and science attitudes. In the present section, we will focus on moral 
concerns about science and scientists.  
Although morality to some extent correlates with religious and political beliefs and 
ideology, as we have touched upon in sections 2.1 and 2.2 (see also Graham et al., 2009; 
Piazza & Sousa, 2014), moral concerns may also play an independent role in the shaping of 
science attitudes (e.g., moral purity concerns predict vaccine skepticism over and beyond 
religious and political beliefs; Rutjens et al., under review; or consider how moral opposition 
to developments in domains such as artificial intelligence or medical health might be 
unrelated to religious or political beliefs and convictions). We will look at morality from two 
different angles. First, we review recent research that measures ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŽǁŶŵŽƌĂůŽƵƚůŽŽŬ
and examines how it might be related to evaluations of science. Second, we review our own 
research that investigated how people perceive the moral values of science and scientists.  
4.1 Moral concerns about science 
Many topics of scientific investigation ? such as evolution or climate change ? may 
ƐƉĞĂŬƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĚĞĞƉůǇŚĞůĚƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůďĞůŝĞĨƐ ?ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂlly, in many cases, these 
ƚŽƉŝĐƐƐƉĞĂŬƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛmoral views about society and the world. Sometimes these moral 
views are engrained in religious or political belief, and sometimes they are not. For example, 
moral concerns about childhood vaccination might generally be rooted in religious faith, 
whereas moral concerns about artificial intelligence might not. Moral views, or moral 
convictions, are referred to in the literature as non-negotiable, because they consist of an 
                                                           
5 The findings reported by Tracy et al. (2011) that mortality reminders generally decrease acceptance of 
evolution, but increase acceptance of evolution among natural-science students, might help explain these 
mixed findings. Future research should investigate further how science can be a repository of existential 
meaning, in particular for those invested in science and the scientific worldview.  Additionally, such research 
could examine more precisely why some manifestations of science provide meaning, whereas others do not. It 
is likely that, besides religiosity, individual differences in science education and scientific literacy play a role. 
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absolute belief that something is either right or wrong (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). 
Thus, moral conviction might interfere with factual interpretations of scientific evidence.    
One compelling example is work on GMO skepticism. Although, in our own research 
described in Section 2.1, we found that vaccine but not GMO skepticism was partially 
predicted by concerns about moral purity, other research finds ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌ “ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞŵŽƌĂů
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ'DO products in the United States (Scott et al., 2016). This work shows 
that 64% of respondents in a survey of representative U.S. residents were opposed to 
GMOs. Moreover, among the opponents, the majority (71%) were categorized as 
 “ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ? ?tŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
GMOs should be prohibited regardless of potential risks or benefits; the mere creation of 
GMOs was seen as a moral violation. Interestingly, it was found that disgust played an 
important role ŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐ ? “ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ ?ŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞĚŝƐŐƵƐƚƐĞŶƐŝƚive in 
general, and were more easily disgusted by the idea of consuming GMOs. These findings 
suggest that moral concerns about purity and naturalness play a role in GMO opposition. 
This notion is further corroborated by Blancke and colleagues (2015), who argue that moral 
concerns about unnaturalness are intuitively appealing to many. These authors further note 
that moral concerns about fairness might also play a role in GMO skepticism; for example, 
some people reason that large multinationals work against small farmers by outcompeting 
and outpricing them. One reason that we did not find evidence for moral purity concerns as 
predictors of GMO skepticism in our own work might be that we did not explicitly focus on 
disgust (Rutjens et al., under review). If we had measured disgust sensitivity as an individual 
difference measure reflecting moral purity concerns, for example, we might have observed 
a stronger relation between moral concern and skepticism about GMOs.  
 Other work has looked at acceptance of scientific evidence more generally, and found 
that acceptance was contingent upon how morally offended participants were by the 
evidence (Colombo et al., 2015). More specifically, participants were presented with various 
statements summarizing (made-up) scientific evidence across various domains, among 
which were statements summarizing research that found particular effects of nutrition on 
health and of gender on professional success. Example statements are  “Being infected with 
the Merrosa-virus increases the chances ŽĨďĞŝŶŐŚŽŵŽƐĞǆƵĂůŝŶŵĂŵŵĂůƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ  “DĞŶĂƌĞ
more successful than women because they are more motivated and they have more 
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cognitive capacities ? ?As predicted, these researchers found that the more people were 
morally offended by these statements, the less they were inclined to accept the evidence as 
true. In a related vein, other research has shown that people are more likely to cherry-pick 
scientific evidence that is in line with their own pre-existing moral values, and also that they 
are more likely to subsequently communicate about that evidence in a positive way in an 
online setting (Bender et al., 2016). Moreover, the more central a certain moral value was to 
ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ ƐĞůĨ-concept, the more positively (s)he evaluated the evidence that was in 
line with this particular value.  
4.2 Concerns about the morality of scientists 
In addition to the aforementioned work that honed in on the moral concerns that 
people might have about various types of scientific evidence, we have examined the moral 
associations that people have with scientists (Rutjens & Heine, 2016). Do people think that 
scientists are good or bad people? We were inspired to study this because of an interesting 
ambivalence; despite the fact that scientists are one of the most respected occupations 
(e.g., Fiske & Dupree, 2014; Harris Poll, 2014), a substantial portion of the general public 
seems to distrust science. Since there was, to our knowledge, virtually no research on 
perceptions of scientists, we devised several studies that aimed to provide some initial 
insight into such perceptions.  
 A first set of studies exploited the representativeness heuristic (or conjunction fallacy; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) in order to gauge intuitive associations between scientists and 
violations of morality. This classic fallacy is a mental shortcut in which people make a 
judgment on the basis of how stereotypical, rather than likely, something is. As a (famous) 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ “>ŝŶĚĂƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ǁĞƌĞĂƐŬĞĚƚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂ
short personal description, whether it is more likely that Linda is either a bank teller, or a 
bank teller and a feminist. The description of Linda mentioned that she is deeply concerned 
with issues of social justice and that she has participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
The majority of participants in the original study (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) opted for the 
feminist bank teller option (which is a subset of the set of bank tellers, and therefore 
logically less likely), arguably because the description that they were given fit the feminist 
category so well. More specifically, participants do not commit this logical fallacy because 
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they believe that all feminists are deeply concerned about social justice issues, or have a 
history of participating in anti-nuclear demonstrations, but rather that a person to which 
this description applies fits the social category of feminists. In our research, we used a 
variety of descriptions depicting various moral transgression that were used in previous 
research on morality (e.g., Gervais, 2014; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Consider the following 
example study: participants read a description about a man named John, who engages in an 
act of cannibalism. Subsequently, they were asked to indicate which option is more likely: 
John is a sports fan, or John is a sports fan and a scientist. In the control conditions, the 
category of scientist was replaced with one of various control targets (e.g., teacher, 
Muslim). The categories were manipulated between-subjects, and in the majority of the 
studies, we also included two more specific scientist categories (i.e., cell biologist, 
experimental psychologist). An overview of the percentage of participants who committed 
the fallacy can be found in Figure 2. When the target category was a scientist, participants 
were significantly more likely to make the conjunction error, suggesting that descriptions of 
cannibalism (and also serial murder, incest, and necrobestiality) fit the category of scientists 
better than a host of control categories6. In other words, when reading descriptions about 
various immoral acts, a substantial percentage of the participants intuitively assumed that 
the protagonist committing the act was a scientist. Interestingly, we found no association of 
scientists with scenarios describing violations of care and fairness. We interpreted these 
results in light of Moral Foundations Theory (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), which 
maintains that morality can be classified along (at least) five foundations, organized into two 
broad categories. The category of binding moral foundations concerns intuitions that are 
centered on the welfare of the group or community, and binds people to roles and duties 
that promote group order and cohesion. These intuitions are ingroup loyalty, authority, and 
purity. The category of individualizing moral foundations concerns intuitions pertaining to 
the welfare of the individual, which function to protect the rights and freedoms of all 
individuals. These intuitions are fairness and care. Our results show that scientists were 
                                                           
6 The only exception was ĂŶ ?ĂƚŚĞŝƐƚ ?ƚĂƌŐĞƚ ?/ŶĂůůƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ?ǁĞĂůƐŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂƚŚĞŝƐƚĂƐĂĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?WƌĞǀŝŽƵƐǁŽƌŬ
has shown a pervasive intuitive atheist-immorality association (Gervais, 2014), and we were interested in 
comparing the association of scientists with immorality with that of atheists. Whereas the association was 
more strong for atheists in some studies, in other studies, it was equally strong or even stronger for scientists. 
In addition, atheists were also associated with violations of care and fairness, and this was not the case for 
scientists.   
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associated with violations of the binding moral foundations of authority and ? particularly ?
purity, but not with violations of the individualizing moral foundations of fairness and care.  
 Using a different method, we tested this notion in another study. Here, we employed 
the moral stereotypes method (Graham et al., 2009), in which participants fill out the moral 
judgments section of the moral foundations questionnaire in the third person. In one 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ĂƐŬĞĚ ƚŽ ƌĞƉůǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ  “ĂƐ :ŽŚŶ ? ǁŚŽ ŝƐ Ă ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚ ?  ?Ğ ?Ő ? ?
John believes that people should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is 
harmed). Compared to the control condition, participants in the scientist condition indicated 
that John cares less about the binding moral foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity 
than those in the control condition. There were no differences in perceived importance of 
care and fairness (see Figure 3). It is worth noting that the associations and stereotypes 
ǁĞƌĞĨŽƵŶĚƚŽďĞůĂƌŐĞůǇŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ŽǁŶƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůďĞůŝĞĨƐĂŶĚ
moral foundations scores, with the exception that religious participants were somewhat 
more extreme in their moral stereotypes of scientists than non-religious participants.   
 The above studies suggest that people perceive scientists as caring less about the 
binding moral foundations than various other categories of people. Given this, what do 
people believe that scientists do care about. Two additional studies indicated that ?
compared to various other categories ? people believe that scientists place relatively more 
value on knowledge gain and satisfying their curiosity than on acting morally. They were 
also seen as potentially dangerous. At the same time, scientists were found to be relatively 
well-liked and trusted. Thus, we concluded that scientists are perceived as capable of 
immoral behavior, but not as immoral per se. Potential immoral conduct might be preceded 





Figure 2. Intuitive associations between various morality violations and scientists. The Y-axis 
indicates the percentage of participants committing a logical fallacy that reflects this 
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Figure 3. Moral stereotypes about scientists: scientists are seen as caring less about loyalty, 
authority, and purity (Rutjens & Heine, 2016).  
 
 

















While our research on perceptions of scientists (see Section 4.2) suggests that people 
generally like and trust scientists (while at the same time viewing them as capable of 
immoral conduct and as potentially dangerous), it is clear that (public) distrust in science is a 
major contemporary challenge (Gilbert et al., 2016; Gleick et al., 2010; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015; Pittinsky, 2015; Nature editorial, 2017a). In addition, recent high-
profile cases of scientific misconduct have further eroded ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĨĂŝƚŚin scientists. In 
this last part of the chapter, we focus on ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ?own crisis of faith and the 
resulting recent movements toward a more open science, and review how popularization 
and accessibility of science might impact on the ƉƵďůŝĐ ?Ɛ attitudes towards science. In doing 
so, we also identify links between open and accessible science and the previous sections on 
ideology, motivation, and morality.  
5.1 Crisis of faith and open science 
  Although much of this chapter concerns the attitudes of the public toward science, 
they are not the only ones who can experience lack of faith in scientific knowledge and 
progress. Indeed, scientists themselves experience collective crises of faith in their 
endeavours. Different disciplines have experienced their own, indigenous crises from time 
to time, often triggered by objective shortcomings including a disciplinary lack of statistical 
expertise, or the pre-eminence of degenerating research programs in which established 
ideas are unable to generate novel and verifiable conclusions (Lakatos, 1976). These are 
relatively technical problems in scientific disciplines of which the public is not likely to be 
aware ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ĨĂŝƚŚ ŝŶ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞcan also be shaken by concerns that are 
strikingly similar to those of the public. These concerns revolve around the perception that 
science is falling short of idealized standards (see Section 2.3) of openness, 
disinterestedness, or skepticism, as well as worries that scientific institutions are essentially 
corrupt in rewarding scientists on grounds other than scientific merit.   
 In recent years, these concerns have been thrown into sharp relief by Ioannidis (2005), 
whose analyses of scientific findings suggested that most of them are false. Ioannidis found 
that false findings are especially likely to emerge when powerful vested interests are at 
stake (e.g., industry funded research), or, paradoxically, when multiple labs are working on 
the same problem  W suggesting that the desire to scoop other labs causes researchers to 
rush findings out to publication without sufficient scrutiny. IŽĂŶŶŝĚŝƐ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĂŶĚ
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conclusions have fuelled concerns about the replicability of scientific findings across several 
disciplines and may also have consequences for public perceptions about the morality of 
science and scientists. These concerns were not doused by major surveys which suggest that 
although a typically fewer than 2% of scientists admit blatant fraud, much larger numbers 
admit engaging in other questionable research practices that exaggerate the significance of 
their findings (Fanelli, 2009; Martinson, Anderson, & de Vries, 2005; but see Fiedler & 
Schwarz, 2016).  Although 2% can be seen as a low number, it is disturbingly high given the 
potential that false findings have to wreak havoc on scientific progress. The impact of the 
behavior of these errant 2% has become all too clear in scandals that have played a 
ĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ůŽǁĞƌŝŶŐ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐ ? ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞir own fields. In health science, the 
sugar lobby paid for and appeared to shape drafts of a review in the New England Journal of 
Medicine that systematically diminished the health risks posed by sugar and exaggerated 
those posed by dietary fat (Kearns, Schmidt, & Glantz, 2016). For its part, of course, social 
psychology was severely shaken by the emergence of several cases of data fraud, most 
notably by Diederik Stapel in 2010.   
 This so-called reproducibility crisis across science has percolated into the public sphere 
through extensive features written by science journalists. Some researchers have argued 
that the lack of public trust in science and scientists stems, at least in part, from legitimate 
concerns about the openness and quality of scientific research (Edwards & Roy, 2016; 
Vazire, 2016). To our knowledge, there is no systematic work on whether the reproducibility 
crisis has had an effect on public faith in science. There is clear evidence that members of 
the public take a dim view of data fraud and manipulation, such that the majority of 
respondents endorse criminal charges for such conduct - but are more tolerant of selective 
reporting of findings and other questionable research practices (Pickett & Roche, in press). 
Certainly, it can be said that the reproducibility crisis has had a profound effect on many 
members of the scientific community. Many scientists are now taking part in efforts to bring 
the practice of science into closer alignment with its ideals. 
Most prominent among these efforts is the open science movement, in which 
researchers and gatekeepers are increasingly adopting, advocating, and requiring open 
research practices, including pre-registration of hypotheses and full disclosure of materials 
and results (e.g., Nosek et al., 2015).  An allied development, at least in social psychology, is 
the adoption of more rigorous methodological and statistical practices. These include 
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principled, a priori determination of sample size, and the elimination of questionable 
research practices that tend to increase the risk of scientific studies producing false-
positives: that is, statistically significant evidence of an effect that does not exist (e.g., Giner-
Sorolla, 2016; Murayama, Pekrun, & Fiedler, 2014) These efforts can be seen as a 
manifestation of the self-correcting nature of science: albeit to varying degrees, scientists 
are willing and able to respond to crises of faith by reaffirming rather than abandoning their 
commitment to science. It is arguably too early to draw any firm conclusions about the 
effects of open science reform on public attitudes towards science. However, it could 
certainly be argued that open science and transparency can have beneficial effects on the 
perceived morality of ? and thus public trust in ? science. In addition, it might also increase 
public understanding of the scientific process, which in turn could enhance the order-
conferring functions of science (understanding the process renders the process more 
structured and predictable).  
The reproducibility crisis clearly illustrates that, despite its privileged position as a 
means of truth-seeking (which, in the long run, guarantees progress), science has important 
limitations that mean the current state of knowledge to be gleaned from the pages of its 
journals cannot be taken as the final word on any subject. Indeed, precisely because science 
is a progressive and self-correcting enterprise that relies on induction, its current findings 
could not be regarded as definitive, even if they were uncompromised by questionable 
research practices (Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015; Gluckman, 2014). This means that not all 
skepticism about scientific findings or even science more generally should be judged as 
unwarranted or irrational.  
The primary focus of this chapter (particularly the research described in Sections 2 and 
4) is not reasonable skepticism, but rather what could be called cynicism about science: for 
example, the perception that (some) science or even the scientific method is fundamentally 
corrupt and unreliable, that even well-established and rigorously obtained findings cannot 
be trusted, or that scientific findings have about the same (or even lower) epistemic value as 
statements of opinion. Again, it is important to note that such fundamental rejection of 
science will be fuelled, at least in part, by a mixture of ideological (Section 2), motivational 
(Section 3), and moral (Section 4) concerns. /ĨƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚƐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
views, threatens a particular psychological motive, or goes against their views on right and 




5.2 Accessibility and popularization of science 
Open science and the crisis of faith in science can also be linked to recent 
developments in how science is conducted and in what is expected of scientists.  
First, there has been a growing interdependence between universities and the 
corporate world. For example, from 1980 to 1998, industry funding of American universities 
increased at an annual rate of 8.1%, and, in the same period, the annual number of patents 
produced by universities increased from 250 to 4800 (Press & Washburn, 2000). As a 
consequence of the growth in corporate ties at universities, scientists have increasing 
opportunities to monetize their research discoveries. Such opportunities add further 
incentives to produce desirable results. For example, one review of clinical drug studies 
found that published articles that were funded by industry produced more outcomes 
ĨĂǀŽƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĚƌƵŐ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ  ? ? ?A? ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚǁŝƚŚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞŶŽƚ ĨƵŶĚĞĚďǇ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ
(79%; Cho & Bero, 1996). These kinds of conflicts of interest seem likely to increase as state 
funding of universities continues to get displaced by industry funding. 
 Second, a rise in questionable research practices might also be the product of the 
growing popularization of science. Compared with the past, science research is being 
covered far more in the popular press. This can be seen in the recent increase in popular 
science books (Turney, 2008), which have become somewhat more sensationalist, as 
typified by the popular articles and books by Malcolm Gladwell (Bobo, 2009). Similarly, 
ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ƚĞůĞǀŝƐŝŽŶ ƐŚŽǁƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ EĞĂů Ğ'ƌĂƐƐĞ dǇƐŽŶ ?ƐCosmos, have proliferated 
(Johnson, Ecklund, & Matthews, in press). In addition, scientists now have more 
opportunities to appear in popular forums themselves, such as TED talks (Caliendo, 2012) 
and science blogs that can reach wide penetration (Blanchard, 2011). Psychology has also 
achieved wider visibility in the media in recent years; for example, since 2010, the Society of 
Personality and Social Psychology has offered a media award each year to promote popular 
coverage of social and personality psychological research. Given this trend of increasingly 
popularized science, we might expect that scientists would feel compelled to produce a 
product that is more fitting for mass consumption. With the incentives of fame and fortune, 
scientists may be tempted to overclaim their findings, to make them more dramatic with 
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broader real-life implications than those which are typically communicated to an academic 
audience. Another consequence of science coverage on the internet that has changed the 
relationship between science and society is that laypeople have more opportunity than ever 
to evaluate scientific research, for example, by commenting on it on social media and blogs. 
Bender et al. (2016) argue that, although there are positive aspects to these developments, 
there is also a danger that such public praise or criticism of research can enter the public 
domain unfiltered, which ĐĂŶŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? 
Of course, popularization of science through TED talks and television shows, popular 
science books, and blogposts may also have positive consequences, where members of the 
public learn more about what scientists actually do and thus become better equipped to 
evaluate the science. For example, some of the cognitive biases and lack of knowledge that 
hamper science understanding might be more easily combated thanks to these 
developments. In addition, more insight into the scientific process (e.g., the occurrence of 
type I and type II errors and the value of failed experiments, the limited life span and 
endless revision of theoretical perspectives every time new evidence comes in) might help 
ƚŽƚĂŬĞĂǁĂǇƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĚŝƐƚƌƵƐƚŝŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?&ŝƌĞƐƚĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?As with open science, 
it might be the case that increased accessibility through popularization has positive effects 
on all of the different levels that are described in this chapter. On the cognitive and 
motivational level (Sections 1 and 3), science understanding might increase, and with it the 
psychological functions of science (e.g., science as a belief system that can provide order, 
control, or meaning; better understanding of a particular scientific theory, so that it might 
provide a sense of order and predictability to the individual). On the ideological and moral 
level (Sections 2 and 4), accessibility of information and movements toward open science 
might increase trust in the scientific enterprise by making the scientists more like  ?normal 
ŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐ ?ĂŶĚtheir work seem more reliable.    
6. CONCLUSION 
The current chapter integrates various lines of recent research investigating the 
antecedents and consequences of how science is evaluated, with the goal of fostering a 
more complete understanding of attitudes towards science. Evaluations of science, scientific 
knowledge, and scientists are shaped not only by cognitive variables, but also by ideology, 
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motivation, and morality. The more conservative variety of religious and political beliefs, but 
also widespread and persistent perceptions of biased agendas and conspiracy thinking, can 
clash with science and consequentially fuel skepticism. Moral concerns about science and 
scientists further decrease science acceptance. However, science can also function as a lens 
though which people view the world, which can actually aid in meeting important 
psychological needs. In other words, for some, science is a belief system that shares 
motivational functions with religious and political ideologies. Understanding the impact of 
ideology, motivation, and morality thus helps to refine and advance our knowledge of how 
science is evaluated. In a time when science is more accessible to the public than ever 
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